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Abstract
I aim to shed light on why emergency room (ER) utilization increased following the Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment but decreased following a Massachusetts policy. To do so, I unite
the literatures on insurance and treatment effects. Under an MTE model that assumes no more
than the LATE assumptions, comparisons across always takers, compliers, and never takers
can inform the impact of polices that expand and contract coverage. Starting from the Ore-
gon experiment as the “gold standard,” I make comparisons within Oregon and extrapolate my
findings to Massachusetts. Within Oregon, I find adverse selection and heterogeneous moral
hazard. Although previous enrollees increased their ER utilization, evidence suggests that sub-
sequent enrollees will be healthier, and they will decrease their ER utilization. Accordingly, I
can reconcile the Oregon and Massachusetts results because the Massachusetts policy expanded
coverage from a higher baseline, and new enrollees reported better health.
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1 Introduction
Findings from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment are considered the “gold standard” for
evidence in health economics because they are based on a randomized lottery. The state of Oregon
conducted the lottery in 2008 as a fair way to expand eligibility for its Medicaid health insur-
ance program to a limited number of uninsured individuals. The lottery also effectively created a
randomized experiment that facilitated evaluation of the impact of Medicaid. It is challenging to
evaluate the impact of Medicaid because there could be “adverse selection” into Medicaid such that
Medicaid enrollees would have worse outcomes than other individuals, even if they were not en-
rolled. Concerns about selection heterogeneity motivate the popularity of results from the Oregon
experiment.
A headline finding from the Oregon experiment is that Medicaid increased emergency room
(ER) utilization (Taubman et al., 2014). Legislation requires that emergency rooms see all patients
regardless of insurance coverage, so the uninsured often access the healthcare system through the
ER. There was hope that Medicaid would decrease ER utilization, either because of substitution
toward primary care or because of improved health. However, it is plausible that Medicaid increased
ER utilization because formerly uninsured individuals could visit the ER at lower personal cost
when enrolled in Medicaid. Any treatment effect of Medicaid on ER utilization can be considered
“moral hazard,” which arises when individuals who gain insurance change their consumption of
the insured good. The sign and magnitude of this type of moral hazard are important for policy
evaluation because care provided in the ER is expensive, but the insured do not necessarily value
additional ER care at its cost, leading to inefficiency.
Meta-analysis and comparisons made in the popular press suggest that moral hazard could
vary across policies, implying that the headline finding from Oregon need not apply directly to all
policies (Rovner, 2014; Sommers and Simon, 2017; Tavernise, 2014). Importantly, several studies
on the Massachusetts health reform of 2006 show that ER utilization decreased or stayed the same
(Chen et al., 2011; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012; Smulowitz et al., 2011). Studies on
other policies yield varying results (Anderson et al., 2012, 2014; Currie and Gruber, 1996; Newhouse
and Rand Corporation Insurance Experiment Group, 1993).
To extrapolate from the Oregon experiment to other policies, including the Massachusetts re-
form, I unite the literatures on insurance and treatment effects. I use a generalized Roy (1951)
model of the marginal treatment effect (MTE) introduced by Björklund and Moffitt (1987), in the
tradition of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005), Carneiro et al. (2011), and Brinch et al.
(2017), to characterize how selection and moral hazard vary independently as Medicaid enroll-
ment expands and contracts. Although the MTE literature generally focuses on variation within a
single context, I use variation from within the Oregon experiment to inform extrapolation to Mas-
sachusetts. I begin with a version of the MTE model shown by Vytlacil (2002) to assume no more
than the local average treatment effect (LATE) assumptions of independence and monotonicity
proposed by Imbens and Angrist (1994). My exposition of the model emphasizes the link between
the MTE and always takers, compliers, and never takers, using the terminology of Angrist et al.
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(1996) from the LATE literature.
Under the model, variation across always takers, compliers, and never takers is variation across
an important margin: the margin of enrollment in Medicaid. Individuals are only always takers,
compilers, or never takers with respect to a given policy. If Medicaid enrollment were to expand
to more lottery entrants, then never takers would enroll, especially if a mandate required them to
do so. If Medicaid enrollment were to contract, then compliers would disenroll, followed by always
takers. Therefore, comparison of ER utilization across always takers, compliers, and never takers is
central to identification of how selection and moral hazard vary as Medicaid enrollment expands and
contracts. I use the model to calculate the average ER utilization of always takers, compliers with
Medicaid, compliers without Medicaid, and never takers, following Imbens and Rubin (1997), Katz
et al. (2001), Abadie (2002), and Abadie (2003).1 I emphasize that calculation of the LATE does
not require calculation of these four averages or even the ability to calculate them.2 Therefore, these
averages provide information that is not contained in the LATE that I can use for identification of
selection and moral hazard heterogeneity.
I define selection and moral hazard heterogeneity using general functions from the model. A
function that I refer to as the marginal untreated outcome (MUO) function defines selection het-
erogeneity along the entire enrollment margin, and the marginal treatment effect (MTE) function
defines moral hazard heterogeneity along the entire enrollment margin. I weight these functions
along ranges of the enrollment margin to construct the special cases of selection and moral hazard
heterogeneity defined in the econometric literature (Angrist (1998) and Heckman et al. (1998) use
a common set of definitions). I demonstrate that the definitions from the literature depend on
the fraction of lottery winners in the Oregon experiment, which is not desirable if the goal is to
characterize underlying behavior that is invariant to a parameter of the experimental design used
to study it. Furthermore, under the definitions from the literature, it is not possible to identify
selection or moral hazard heterogeneity without ancillary assumptions.
Using the general functions, I can identify a special case of selection heterogeneity without
1I illustrate the calculations graphically in Appendix C to build intuition. The calculations rely on average
ER utilization for four observed groups: lottery losers with Medicaid (always takers only), lottery winners with
Medicaid (always takers and compliers with Medicaid), lottery losers without Medicaid (never takers and compliers
without Medicaid), and lottery winners without Medicaid (never takers only). Because of randomization, average
ER utilization of lottery losers with Medicaid identifies average ER utilization with Medicaid for all always takers,
even the lottery winners. Similarly, average ER utilization of lottery winners without Medicaid identifies average ER
utilization without Medicaid for all never takers. Furthermore, the fraction of always takers among lottery losers
and the fraction of never takers among lottery winners identify the respective fractions in the full sample. Using
these fractions and average ER utilization for always takers with Medicaid and never takers without Medicaid, it
is straightforward to back out average ER utilization for compliers with and without Medicaid from the average
ER utilization for lottery winners with Medicaid and lottery losers without Medicaid. (It is not possible to calculate
average ER utilization for always takers without Medicaid or never takers with Medicaid without ancillary assumptions
because these groups do not change their enrollment based on the lottery.)
2The Wald (1940) approach to calculate the LATE divides the “reduced form,” the average difference in ER
utilization between lottery winners and losers, by the “first stage,” the average difference in Medicaid enrollment
between lottery winners and losers. As shown by Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Krueger (1992), it is possible to
calculate the LATE using two separate datasets: one that includes ER utilization by lottery status (for the reduced
form), and another that includes Medicaid enrollment by lottery status (for the first stage). However, it is not possible
to observe ER utilization by lottery status and Medicaid enrollment in either dataset, so it is not possible to calculate
any of the four averages.
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further assumptions. I do so using a test that I refer to as the “untreated outcome test,” which
compares outcomes of compliers and and never takers. Similarly, I use a test that I refer to as
the “treated outcome test,” which compares outcomes of compliers and always takers, to identify
the combined impact of selection and moral hazard heterogeneity. These tests are equivalent to
tests proposed in the econometric literature by Bertanha and Imbens (2014); Guo et al. (2014);
Black et al. (2015), and Mogstad et al. (2017), who also propose testing both jointly. The tests
of Hausman (1978); Heckman (1979); Willis and Rosen (1979); Angrist (2004); Huber (2013) and
Brinch et al. (2017) can also be expressed in terms of functions of the treated and untreated
outcome tests (see Bertanha and Imbens, 2014). My innovation is in the interpretation. I emphasize
that the distinction between the untreated and the treated is an important one, especially in
insurance contexts where the distinction separates the insured from the uninsured. By relating these
tests to general functions from the MTE model, I show that the untreated outcome tests isolates
selection heterogeneity, and the treated outcome test identifies the combined influence of selection
and treatment effect heterogeneity. Without ancillary assumptions, the joint implementation of the
treated and untreated outcome tests is no more informative about treatment effect heterogeneity
than the treated outcome test is on its own.
Tests from the insurance literature also cannot separately identify moral hazard heterogeneity
within the Oregon experiment without ancillary assumptions. Uniting the insurance and treatment
effects literatures, I demonstrate that Einav et al. (2010) cost curve tests from the insurance lit-
erature can be applied within the Oregon experiment. I emphasize that the Einav et al. (2010)
cost curve test applied to uninsured costs is equivalent to the untreated outcome test. Therefore,
it identifies selection heterogeneity. Furthermore, the Einav et al. (2010) cost curve test applied to
insured costs is equivalent to the treated outcome test. Therefore, it identifies heterogeneous moral
hazard, or heterogeneous selection, or both. The Einav et al. (2010) cost curve test applied to the
difference between insured and uninsured costs would identify heterogeneous moral hazard, but it
cannot be run within the Oregon experiment without ancillary assumptions because only one point
on the curve is identified. Other tests from the insurance literature also cannot separately identify
moral hazard heterogeneity within the Oregon experiment without ancillary assumptions. Under
the Chiappori and Salanie (2000) positive correlation test, a correlation between insurance cover-
age and insured spending could indicate heterogeneous moral hazard, or heterogeneous selection,
or both. Under the Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) unused observables test, a correlation between a
covariate and insurance coverage and a second correlation between the same covariate and insured
spending could also indicate heterogeneous moral hazard, or heterogeneous selection, or both.
To separately identify moral hazard heterogeneity, I impose two ancillary assumptions following
Brinch et al. (2017), who impose them to study the impact of family size on child outcomes. In my
context, the first ancillary assumption requires that ER utilization without Medicaid varies linearly
with the fraction of the sample enrolled in Medicaid conditional on the lottery outcome. Under
this assumption, the linear marginal untreated outcome (MUO) function identifies selection hetero-
geneity along the entire enrollment margin. The second ancillary assumption, which is equivalent
to an assumption made by Olsen (1980) to study the impact of family size on maternal outcomes,
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requires linearity of a function that I refer to as the marginal treated outcome (MTO) function. In
my context, the MTO function characterizes how ER utilization for Medicaid enrollees changes as
Medicaid enrollment expands and contracts. I emphasize that the MTO function characterizes the
combined impact of selection and moral hazard heterogeneity.
Under both ancillary assumptions, the difference between the MTO and MUO functions yields
a linear marginal treatment effect (MTE) function, which I use to characterize how moral hazard
varies as Medicaid enrollment expands and contracts. Linearity of the MTE function has precedent
as a direct assumption in applied work (see Moffitt, 2008; French and Song, 2014). Furthermore,
applied work that extrapolates as if the LATE applies everywhere makes an implicit assumption
that the MTE function is linear and has zero slope.
To extrapolate from the Oregon experiment to other policies, including the Massachusetts re-
form, I reweight the Oregon MTE using weights that are special cases of general weights for MTE
reweighting given by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007). Unlike the weights used by Brinch et al. (2017),
these weights allow me to recover and predict outcomes and treatment effects for always takers,
compliers, and never takers, which are of interest for extrapolation to specific policies that induce
full enrollment or full dis-enrollment. I emphasize that using these weights, I only need one of the
two ancillary assumptions to predict the impact of policies that enroll all never takers or dis-enroll
all always takers.
To extrapolate using observables, I incorporate a shape restriction into both ancillary assump-
tions. This shape restriction is common in the MTE literature (Carneiro and Lee, 2009; Carneiro
et al., 2011; Maestas et al., 2013; Kline and Walters, 2016; Brinch et al., 2017). In my context,
it requires that included observables and the residual unobserved net cost of Medicaid enrollment
have additively-separable impacts on potential ER utilization with and without Medicaid. Depart-
ing from the literature, which places little emphasis on the choice of included observables, I vary
the included observables to determine which ones explain the moral hazard heterogeneity I find.
I begin my empirical analysis by taking the model without any ancillary assumptions to the
data. By using publicly available data previously used to evaluate the Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment, I encourage further replication and future work.3 I replicate the headline finding that
moral hazard is positive: Medicaid increases ER utilization. Per Imbens and Angrist (1994) and
Angrist et al. (1996), the headline finding is interpretable as a LATE that only applies to compliers.
Within my analysis sample, only 26% of individuals are compliers, while 15% are always takers
and 59% are never takers. Always and never takers are possible because individuals entered the
experiment by joining a waitlist for Medicaid, but they were only required to provide eligibility
documentation if they won. Therefore, always takers, who might not have been aware of their
prior eligibility when they entered the waitlist, could still enroll even if they lost. Medicaid allows
hospitals to facilitate retroactive enrollment of eligibles, so it is possible that some always takers
enrolled after visiting the ER. On the other side of the spectrum, never takers did not enroll even if
3Publicly available data are rare in a landscape of proprietary and confidential data in health economics. I
am grateful to the investigators of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment for making their data available. I
co-developed the Stata command mtebinary to aid replication of my results (Kowalski et al., 2016).
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they won, either because they were ineligible or because they did not submit eligibility information
in the required timeframe.
Examining ER utilization, I find that never takers have lower average ER utilization than
compliers without Medicaid, which identifies adverse selection from compliers to never takers via the
untreated outcome test. Applying the treated outcome test, I find that always takers have higher
average ER utilization than compliers with Medicaid. This result is consistent with decreasing
moral hazard or adverse selection from always takers to compliers. To separately identify moral
hazard heterogeneity, I impose the ancillary assumptions, and I find that moral hazard decreases
from always takers to compliers to never takers, so much so that average moral hazard is negative
for never takers. Therefore, subsequent expansions of Medicaid in Oregon could result in decreased
use of the ER.
Before extrapolating to Massachusetts, I assess whether my findings from within Oregon apply
within Massachusetts. To do so, I recast my previous work on the Massachusetts reform from
Hackmann et al. (2015), which builds on the Einav et al. (2010) model from the insurance literature,
in terms of the MTE model with ancillary assumptions. I show that the marginal cost curve for
the insured minus the uninsured is an MTE function. Therefore, Hackmann et al. (2015) shows a
decreasing MTE function for total health care costs, which is consistent with the decreasing MTE
function for ER utilization that I find in Oregon.
I acknowledge that there are several factors that could have differed between the Massachusetts
and Oregon contexts. The Oregon policy was a randomized lottery conducted only for individuals
who entered it, and the Massachusetts reform was a state-wide policy. Furthermore, institutional
features of the health care environment could have differed across states. As discussed by Miller
(2012), Massachusetts had an uncompensated care pool that might have encouraged excess emer-
gency care before its dissolution and replacement under the Massachusetts reform. Also, health
insurance terms could also have differed, especially since Oregon expanded Medicaid alone and
Massachusetts also expanded other types of coverage. Despite these differences, the MTE in Ore-
gon and the MTE in Massachusetts both slope downward, suggesting that in both contexts, those
who increase their utilization the most in response to health insurance coverage enroll first.
Given decreasing MTE functions in Oregon and Massachusetts, I rely on the Oregon experiment
as the “gold standard,” and I characterize the Massachusetts reform as an expansion of Medicaid
along the Oregon MTE. Because enrollment levels were high in Massachusetts before and after
the reform, MTE-reweighting predicts that Massachusetts compliers respond to insurance like a
subset of Oregon never takers. With MTE-reweighting, I predict a decrease in ER utilization in
Massachusetts of the same order of magnitude as the decrease found by Miller (2012). MTE-
reweighting thus offers a plausible potential pathway to reconcile the increase in ER utilization
found in Oregon with the decrease in ER utilization found in Massachusetts.
To explore potential mechanisms for why the impact of coverage on ER utilization is positive
for some groups but negative for others, I examine observables. I begin by examining self-reported
health. Finkelstein et al. (2012) shows that Medicaid improved self-reported health within the Ore-
gon experiment, so I only compare the self-reported health of groups without Medicaid: compliers
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who lost the lottery and never takers. I find that 55% of Oregon compliers report fair or poor
health, while only 34% of Oregon never takers report fair or poor health. The difference is sta-
tistically different from zero, indicating adverse selection on self-reported health via the untreated
outcome test. I also find suggestive evidence of adverse selection on self-reported health within
Massachusetts. However, the difference between Massachusetts and Oregon is even more striking
than the difference within Massachusetts: only 21% of Massachusetts compliers report fair or poor
health. These comparisons suggest an important potential mechanism for my findings—upon gain-
ing coverage, individuals in worse health increase their ER utilization, while individuals in better
health decrease their ER utilization.
Examination of ER utilization from before the Oregon lottery took place corroborates the role
of health as a potential mechanism for why ER utilization increased in Oregon but decreased in
Massachusetts. Before the lottery took place, always takers visited the ER more than compliers,
who visited the ER more than never takers, indicating adverse selection. Furthermore, when I
include previous ER utilization in the Oregon MTE, I can explain the entire decrease in moral
hazard from always takers to compliers to never takers. This evidence suggests that differences
in previous ER utilization between Oregon compliers and Massachusetts compliers could explain
the entire difference between the positive Oregon LATE and the negative Massachusetts LATE.
Unfortunately, I do not observe previous ER utilization in my Massachusetts data, so I cannot
extrapolate with it directly, but MTE-reweighting effectively allows me to extrapolate based on an
unobservable that captures previous ER utilization and health.
When I use available observables for extrapolation, I can still reconcile the Oregon and Mas-
sachusetts results with MTE-reweighting, even though I cannot with LATE-reweighting following
Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2013) in the tradition of Hotz et al. (2005). I examine the three common
observables available for all individuals in the Oregon and Massachusetts data: age, gender, and an
indicator for communications in English. These observables are similar across both contexts. When
I incorporate them into the Oregon MTE, they do not explain differences in ER utilization across
always takers, compliers, and never takers. Furthermore, consistent with evidence from Taubman
et al. (2014), I find that treatment effects on compliers are positive within the vast majority of
subgroups determined by the common observables. Accordingly, LATE-reweighting would yield a
Massachusetts LATE even more positive than the Oregon LATE. In contrast, MTE-reweighting
with an MTE that incorporates the common observables can still reconcile the positive LATE in
Oregon with the negative LATE in Massachusetts.
2 Model of Selection and Moral Hazard Heterogeneity
2.1 First Stage: Enrollment in Medicaid
Let D represent enrollment in Medicaid, which can be thought of as the “treatment” offered by
the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. Let VT represent potential utility in the treated state
(enrolled in Medicaid, D = 1), and let VU represent potential utility in the untreated state (not
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enrolled in Medicaid, D = 0).4 The following definition relates realized utility V to the potential
utilities:
V = VU + (VT − VU )D. (1)
I specify the potential utilities as follows:
VT = µT (Z,X) + νT (2)
VU = µU (Z,X) + νU , (3)
where νT and νU are unobserved terms with unspecified distributions, X is an optional vector of
observed covariates, and Z is an observed binary instrument.5 The unspecified functions µT (·)
and µU (·) translate the covariates and instrument into units of utility. In the Oregon context,
the instrument represents the outcome of the randomized lottery. I begin by considering only
individuals who participated in the lottery, so Z ∈ {0, 1} for all individuals. Individuals with
Z = 0 are lottery losers, so I refer to them as the “control group.” Individuals with Z = 1 are
lottery winners that receive the lotteried intervention, an opportunity to be eligible for a lotteried
Medicaid program, so I refer to them as the “intervention group.” I need different terminology for
the intervention group (Z = 1) and the treatment group (D = 1) because not all Oregon lottery
winners enrolled in Medicaid. I assume
A.1. (First Stage Independence) The random variable νU − νT is independent of Z conditional on
X, which implies that F (νU − νT | X), denoted as UD, is independent of Z conditional on X.
A.2. (First Stage Technical Assumption) The cumulative distribution function of νU − νT condi-
tional on X, which I denote with F , is continuous and strictly increasing.
These assumptions allow me to derive the following equation for enrollment in Medicaid conditional
on the lottery outcome:
D = 1{UD ≤ P(D = 1 | Z = z,X)}, (4)
where UD = F (νU − νT | X). The enrollment equation (4) follows from the statement that
individuals enroll in Medicaid if their potential treated utility VT exceeds their untreated potential
utility VU . To make my exposition of the model self-contained, I present the proof in Appendix A.
4Rubin (1974), Rubin (1977), and Holland (1986) are credited with developing the idea of potential outcomes.
Here, I use this idea for an unobserved utility V rather than an observed outcome Y . Also, I use subscripts T and U
rather than 1 and 0 to emphasize that they represent the treated and untreated states and avoid confusion with the
states of winning and losing a lottery.
5 For expositional clarity, I specify (2) and (3) separately, but for the derivation of the enrollment equation, I only
need to specify the difference between them:
VT − VU = µ̃(Z,X) + ν̃
where µ̃(Z,X) = µT (Z,X)− µU (Z,X) and ν̃ = νT − νU . The terms µT (Z,X) and µU (Z,X) need not be additively
separable from each other, and the terms νT and νU need not be additively separable from each other. Vytlacil
(2002) shows that the additive separability of µ̃(Z,X) from ν̃ is equivalent to the LATE monotonicity assumption
of Imbens and Angrist (1994). Intuitively, an interaction between the two terms could allow winning the lottery to
increase enrollment for some individuals and decrease enrollment for others.
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The enrollment equation (4) implies that individuals enroll in Medicaid if their value of UD is
less than the threshold P(D = 1 | Z = z,X). The model implies that UD is distributed uniformly
between 0 and 1. For completeness, I present the proof in Appendix B. I interpret UD as the
“(unobserved net) cost of enrollment,” such that individuals with the lowest cost of enrollment
enroll in Medicaid first. The term “net” emphasizes that UD represents enrollment costs net of
enrollment benefits and therefore that it does not make a material distinction between costs and
benefits.
There are two special cases of the enrollment equation (4) for the lottery losers and winners:
D = 1{UD ≤ pCX} where pCX = P
(
D = 1 | Z = 0, X), (5)
D = 1{UD ≤ pIX} where pIX = P
(
D = 1 | Z = 1, X), (6)
where the probabilities pCX and pIX can be estimated in the control group (Z = 0) and the
intervention group (Z = 1), respectively. Without loss of generality, I proceed with pCX ≤ pIX .6
To ensure that the lottery is relevant for enrollment, but not necessarily coincident with the lottery
outcome, I assume:
A.3. (First Stage Relevance) µT (Z,X)−µU (Z,X) is a nondegenerate random variable conditional
on X.
A.4. (First Stage Enrollment Differs from Lottery Outcome with Positive Probability) 0 < P(D =
1 | Z = z,X) < 1.
In practice, assumptions A.3 and A.4 are verifiable.
As I show in Figure 1 these assumptions allow me to identify three distinct ranges of the
enrollment margin, UD. As originally shown by Vytlacil (2002), the three ranges of UD correspond
to ranges for always takers, compliers, and never takers (the model excludes defiers). Within my
analysis sample, 15% of lottery losers enroll and 41% of lottery winners enroll. Accordingly, in
Figure 1, I depict pC = 0.15 and pI = 0.41, suppressing X to emphasize that these quantities are
averages in the full analysis sample, not in a sample conditional on X. In the top line of Figure 1,
I depict the lottery losers. By (5), I infer that enrolled lottery losers, who must be always takers,
have 0 ≤ UD ≤ 0.15. In the middle line of Figure 1, I depict the lottery winners. By (6), I infer
that the unenrolled lottery winners, who must be never takers, have 0.41 < UD ≤ 1. In the bottom
line of Figure 1, I depict UD for lottery losers and winners on the same axis, and I label the implied
ranges of UD for always and never takers. Individuals with values of UD in the middle range,
0.15 < UD ≤ 0.41, enroll in Medicaid if they win the lottery, but they do not enroll if they lose the
lottery, so these individuals must be compliers.
The depiction of UD that I show in the bottom line of Figure 1 provides more information
than the “first stage” typically reported in the LATE literature, which is equal to P (D = 1 | Z =
1) − P (D = 1 | Z = 0) = pI − pC . The first stage conveys the share of compliers, but it does not
6If pCX ≥ pIX , then it is always possible to rename the intervention group as the control group and vice versa so
that this condition is satisfied.
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Figure 1: Ranges of UD for Always Takers, Compliers, and Never Takers





Z = 0 D = 1 D = 0
D = 1 D = 0
UD: unobserved net cost of enrollment
convey the separate shares of always takers and never takers. I emphasize that the ordering from
always takers to compliers to never takers along UD is an ordering across an important margin: the
margin of enrollment in Medicaid. As Medicaid enrollment expands along the enrollment margin,
always takers enroll first, followed by compliers, followed by never takers.
2.2 Second Stage: Relating Enrollment in Medicaid to ER Utilization
I relate Medicaid enrollment D to realized ER utilization Y as follows:
Y = YU + (YT − YU )D, (7)
where I specify potential ER utilization with Medicaid YT and without Medicaid YU as follows:
YT = gT (X,UD, γT ) (8)
YU = gU (X,UD, γU ), (9)
where gT (·) and gU (·) are unspecified functions that need not be additively separable in their
observed an unobserved components, unlike the potential utility functions in (2) and (3). X is the
same optional vector of observed covariates from the first stage of the model, UD is the unobserved
net cost of enrollment from the first stage of the model, and γT and γU represent additional
unobserved heterogeneity in the second stage of the model. I assume:
A.5. (Second Stage Independence) The random vector (UD, γT ) and the random vector (UD, γU )
are independent of Z conditional on X.
In Appendix C, I use this assumption to calculate the expected values of YT for always takers and
compliers and the expected values of YU for compliers and never takers from the model, consistent
with the approaches of Imbens and Rubin (1997), Katz et al. (2001), Abadie (2002), and Abadie
(2003), which rely on the LATE assumptions of independence and monotonicity. As a whole, the
model, given by the utility equations (1)–(3), the selection equations (4)–(6), the potential outcome
equations (7)–(9), and assumptions (A.1)–(A.5) assumes no more than the LATE assumptions, as
shown by Vytlacil (2002) and applied by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).7
7To ensure that the model assumes no more than the LATE assumptions, I only make the following stylistic
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2.3 Selection and Moral Hazard Heterogeneity in the Model
I characterize selection and moral hazard heterogeneity on Y along the entire enrollment margin
using functions from the MTE literature (see Carneiro and Lee, 2009; Brinch et al., 2017):
Selection and Moral Hazard Heterogeneity: MTO(x, p) = E [YT | X = x, UD = p] (10)
Selection Heterogeneity: MUO(x, p) = E [YU | X = x, UD = p] (11)
Moral Hazard Heterogeneity: MTE(x, p) = E [YT − YU | X = x, UD = p] , (12)
where x is a realization of the covariate vector X and p is a realization of the unobserved net cost
of enrollment UD. I refer to the first two functions as the “marginal treated outcome (MTO)” and
“marginal untreated outcome (MUO)” functions. Their difference yields the “marginal treatment
effect (MTE)” function of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005).
I emphasize that the MUO function characterizes selection heterogeneity on Y along the entire
enrollment margin and that the MTE function characterizes moral hazard heterogeneity on Y along
the entire enrollment margin. The MTO function is the sum of the MUO and MTE functions, so it
captures selection plus moral hazard heterogeneity on Y along the entire enrollment margin. At each
point p along the enrollment margin, the slope of the MUO function determines whether selection
is adverse or advantageous. Similarly, the slope of the MTE function determines whether moral
hazard is decreasing or increasing. Uniting insurance terminology with econometric terminology,
I emphasize that the MTE function characterizes “moral hazard heterogeneity” on Y along the
enrollment margin, which is equivalent to “selection on moral hazard,” “selection on the treatment
effect,” “selection on the gain,” and “treatment effect heterogeneity” on Y along the enrollment
margin.
Definitions of selection and moral hazard hetergeneity widely used in the econometrics literature,
for example, by Angrist (1998) and Heckman et al. (1998), imply the following equations:8
Selection Heterogeneity from Literature: E[YU | D = 1]− E[YU | D = 0] (13)
Moral Hazard Heterogeneity from Literature: E[YT − YU | D = 1]− E[YT − YU | D = 0]. (14)
I can weight the MUO and MTE functions to obtain the definitions from the literature as special
changes to the model presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005): (i) I use slightly different notation; (ii) I add
equations (2) and (3) to provide an intuitive derivation of the selection equation (4), explaining in footnote 5 that
only the difference between (2) and (3) matters; (iii) I present A.1 and A.5 as two different assumptions to emphasize
that the model relies on independence assumptions in the first and second stages; (iv) I assume A.2 which implies
that the distribution of UD is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, but all proofs hold with the
weaker assumption; (v) I assume A.4 which adds a Z term that I believe was omitted from 1 > P(D = 1 | X) > 0
in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005); (vi) I make UD explicit in the potential outcome equations (8)-(9); and (vii) I omit
the assumption that E[YT ] and E[YU ] are finite, which will be implied by my ancillary assumptions.
8The literature refers to (13) as the “selection bias term” that results from using the observed outcome difference
E[Y | D = 1]− E[Y | D = 0] to estimate E[YT − YU | D = 1], the effect of treatment on the treated of Rubin (1977).
10





P(Z = 0 | D = 1)ω(p, 0, pc) + P(Z = 1 | D = 1)ω(p, 0, pI)
− P(Z = 0 | D = 0)ω(p, pc, 1)− P(Z = 1 | D = 0)ω(p, pI , 1)
]
MUO(p) dp (15)
with weights ω(p, pL, pH) = 1{pL ≤ p < pH}/(pH − pL). In doing so, I make it clear that selection
heterogeneity from the literature depends on the fraction of lottery losers and the fraction of
lottery winners, which is not desirable if the goal is to characterize underlying behavior that is
invariant to parameters of the experimental design used to study it. Furthermore, the special case
of selection heterogeneity from the literature is not identified without ancillary assumptions because
the average untreated outcome for always takers is not observed. In contrast, I identify a different
policy-relevant special case of selection heterogeneity without ancillary assumptions.
3 Identifying Selection and Moral Hazard Heterogeneity
3.1 The Untreated Outcome Test
I identify a special case of selection heterogeneity along one range of the enrollment margin, UD,
without ancillary assumptions by comparing average ER utilization without Medicaid between
compliers (pC < UD ≤ pI) and never takers (pI < UD ≤ 1):
E[YU | pC < UD ≤ pI ]− E[YU | pI < UD ≤ 1] =
∫ 1
0
(ω(p, pC , pI)− ω(p, pI , 1)) MUO(p) dp, (16)
where ω(p, pL, pH) = 1{pL ≤ p < pH}/(pH − pL). I refer to the test of the null hypothesis that
(16) is equal to zero as the “untreated outcome test,” which is refutable and verifiable with a large
enough sample. This test is equivalent to tests proposed in the econometric literature by Bertanha
and Imbens (2014), Guo et al. (2014), Black et al. (2015), and Mogstad et al. (2017). My innovation
is in interpretation. By relating the test to the marginal untreated outcome function from the MTE
model, I show that that a rejection of the untreated outcome test identifies selection heterogeneity.
My innovation relative to the insurance literature is that by modeling the Oregon experiment with
the MTE model, I show that it is possible to test for selection heterogeneity within the Oregon
experiment. I emphasize that the untreated outcome test is equivalent to the Einav et al. (2010)
cost curve test for selection heterogeneity applied to uninsured costs.
3.2 The Treated Outcome Test
Similarly, I can also compare average ER utilization with Medicaid between always takers (0 ≤
UD ≤ pC) and compliers (pC < UD ≤ pI) without ancillary assumptions:
E[YT | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pC ]− E[YT | pC < UD ≤ pI ] =
∫ 1
0
(ω(p, 0, pC)− ω(p, pC , pI)) MTO(p) dp, (17)
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where ω(p, pL, pH) = 1{pL ≤ p < pH}/(pH − pL). I refer to the test of the null hypothesis that
(17) is equal to zero as the “treated outcome test.” This test is equivalent to tests proposed
in the econometric literature by Bertanha and Imbens (2014), Guo et al. (2014), Black et al.
(2015), and Mogstad et al. (2017). It is also equivalent to the Einav et al. (2010) cost curve test
from the insurance literature when applied to insured costs. By relating the treated outcome test
to the marginal treated outcome function from the MTE model, I show that a rejection of the
treated outcome test implies moral hazard heterogeneity, or selection heterogeneity, or both types
of heterogeneity, between always takers and compliers.
I emphasize that the distinction between the treated and the untreated is a meaningful one,
especially in insurance contexts where the distinction separates the insured and the uninsured. It
is tempting to assert that the treated and untreated outcome tests must be equally informative
because it is possible to rename the treated group as the untreated group and vice versa. However,
changing the definition of the treatment also changes the definition of the treatment effect. The
treatment effect is YT−YU , not |YT−YU |, so the distinction between treated and untreated matters.
The untreated outcome test cannot identify treatment effect heterogeneity. The treated outcome
test can reflect treatment effect heterogeneity, but it cannot identify treatment effect heterogeneity
without ancillary assumptions.
Other tests from the econometric literature also cannot identify treatment effect heterogeneity
without ancillary assumptions. Tests from the econometric literature can often be expressed in
terms of functions of the treated and untreated outcome tests (see the discussion in Bertanha and
Imbens, 2014). I emphasize that without ancillary assumptions, the joint treated and untreated
outcome test is no more informative about treatment effect heterogeneity than the treated outcome
test is on its own.
Tests from the insurance literature also cannot separately identify moral hazard heterogeneity
in the context of the Oregon experiment without ancillary assumptions. The cost curve test of
Einav et al. (2010) applied to insured costs is equivalent to the treated outcome test. Therefore,
it identifies heterogeneous moral hazard, or heterogeneous selection, or both. The Einav et al.
(2010) cost curve test applied to the difference between insured and uninsured costs would identify
heterogeneous moral hazard, but it cannot be run within the Oregon experiment without ancillary
assumptions because only one point on the curve is identified. Other tests from the insurance
literature also cannot separately identify moral hazard heterogeneity within the Oregon experiment
without ancillary assumptions. Under the Chiappori and Salanie (2000) positive correlation test,
a correlation between insurance coverage and insured spending could indicate heterogeneous moral
hazard, or heterogeneous selection, or both. Under the Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) unused
observables test, a correlation between a covariate and insurance coverage and a second correlation
between the same covariate and insured spending could also indicate heterogeneous moral hazard,
or heterogeneous selection, or both.
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4 Extrapolation Using Selection and Moral Hazard Heterogeneity
Using the untreated outcome test, I can identify selection heterogeneity along a range of the Med-
icaid enrollment margin. Using the treated outcome test, I can identify possible moral hazard
heterogeneity along another range of the enrollment margin, but I cannot separate it from selection
heterogeneity. To predict how moral hazard would change under a wide range of policies, I impose
ancillary assumptions to identify how moral hazard changes along the entire enrollment margin.
4.1 Under Ancillary Assumptions
I begin by imposing the following ancillary assumptions following Brinch et al. (2017), who impose
AA.1 and AA.2 to examine the impact of family size on child outcomes, and Olsen (1980), who
imposes an assumption equivalent to AA.1 to examine the impact of family size on maternal
outcomes:
AA.1. (Linearity of MTO(p) in p) From (8), let YT = αT +θTUD +γT , where E [γT | UD = p] = 0.
Therefore, MTO(p) = E [YT | UD = p] = αT + θT p.
AA.2. (Linearity of MUO(p) in p) From (9), let YU = αU +θUUD +γU , where E [γU | UD = p] = 0.
Therefore, MUO(p) = E [YU | UD = p] = αU + θUp.
In my context, these assumptions require that potential ER utilization varies linearly with the
fraction of the sample enrolled in Medicaid conditional on the lottery outcome. These assumptions
are informed by the model because they relate the unobserved net cost of enrollment UD in the
first stage to potential outcomes in the second stage. Under these assumptions, the variation that
identifies the untreated outcome test identifies the intercept and slope of the MUO function, and
the variation that identifies the treated outcome test identifies the intercept and slope of the MTO
function.
The combination of AA.1 and AA.2 implies the following linear MTE function:
MTE(p) = E [YT − YU | UD = p] = (αT − αU ) + (θT − θU )p.
In my context, linearity of the MTE function implies that moral hazard varies linearly with the
fraction of the sample enrolled in Medicaid conditional on the lottery outcome. Linearity of the
MTE function has precedent as a direct assumption in applied work (see Moffitt, 2008; French
and Song, 2014). Applied work that extrapolates to other policies using the LATE also makes an
implicit assumption that the MTE function is linear and has zero slope.
Under AA.1 and AA.2, the slope of the linear MTE function identifies moral hazard heterogene-
ity on Y along the entire enrollment margin. Under AA.2, the slope of the linear MUO function
identifies selection heterogeneity on Y along the entire enrollment margin. Therefore, under AA.1
and AA.2, selection and moral hazard heterogeneity are separately identified along the entire en-
rollment margin.
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Using selection and moral hazard heterogeneity along the enrollment margin, I can extrapolate
to predict the impacts of a wide range of policies. To do so, I integrate the weighted MTE function
and its component MTO and MUO functions over a general range of the enrollment margin pL <
UD ≤ pH as follows:
E [YT | pL < UD ≤ pH ] =
∫ 1
0
ω(p, pL, pH)MTO(p) dp (18)
E [YU | pL < UD ≤ pH ] =
∫ 1
0
ω(p, pL, pH)MUO(p) dp (19)
E [YT − YU | pL < UD ≤ pH ] =
∫ 1
0
ω(p, pL, pH)MTE(p) dp, (20)
using weights ω(p, pL, pH) = 1{pL < p ≤ pH}/(pH − pL). These weights are special cases of general
weights for MTE-reweighting given by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007). Unlike the weights used by
Brinch et al. (2017), these weights allow me to recover exact values of observed average outcomes
for always takers (0 ≤ UD ≤ pC), compliers (pC < UD ≤ pI), and never takers (pI < UD ≤ 1),
which are of interest for extrapolation to specific policies. To predict the impact of specific policies
that enroll all never takers or dis-enroll all always takers, I only need one of the two ancillary
assumptions.
4.2 Incorporating Observables
When extrapolating from the Oregon experiment to the Massachusetts reform, it might be desirable
to assess the impact of adjusting for observable differences between the two populations. To do so,
I incorporate observables directly into the linear MUO and MTO functions via a shape restriction
commonly used in the MTE literature (see Brinch et al., 2017; Carneiro and Lee, 2009; Carneiro
et al., 2011; Maestas et al., 2013). In my context, the shape restriction requires that included
observables and the remaining unobserved net cost of Medicaid enrollment have additively-separable
impacts on potential ER utilization with and without Medicaid:
AA.3. (Linearity of MTO(x, p) in p) From (8), let YT = β
′
TX+δTUD+ξT where E [ξT | X = x, UD = p] =
0. Therefore, MTO(x, p) = E [YT | X = x, UD = p] = β′Tx+ δT p.
AA.4. (Linearity of MUO(x, p) in p) From (9), let YU = β
′
UX+δUUD+ξU where E [ξU | X = x, UD = p] =
0. Therefore, MUO(x, p) = E [YU | X = x, UD = p] = β′Ux+ δUp.
Assumptions AA.3 and AA.4 imply the following MTE function:
MTE(x, p) = E [YT − YU | X = x, UD = p] = (βT − βU )′x+ (δT − δU )p.
I present an algorithm for estimation of these functions that simplifies the Heckman et al. (2006)
algorithm in Appendix D.9 I reweight these functions using the same approach that I use in (19)–
9For inference, I bootstrap using 200 replications, and I report the standard deviation as the standard error or
the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles as the 95% confidence interval.
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(20). Departing from the literature, which places little emphasis on the choice of observables, I use
MTE-reweighting to determine which observables explain moral hazard heterogeneity and are thus
more important for extrapolation.
5 Results
Starting from the premise that the Oregon experiment is the “gold standard,” my focus is to use
selection and moral hazard heterogeneity from within the experiment to predict the impact to other
policies. The focus of my work is not to evaluate the design or implementation of the lottery, which
has been discussed in Baicker et al. (2013, 2014); Taubman et al. (2014), and Finkelstein et al.
(2016). I am able to replicate results from Taubman et al. (2014), limited only by minor changes
made to the publicly available data to limit identification of individuals with large and uncommon
numbers of ER visits. The probability of winning the lottery was only random conditional on the
number of entrants from the household, so I conduct my analysis using all individuals that were
the only members of their household to enter, resulting in a sample size of 19,643 individuals with
administrative data on their visits to the ER.
5.1 Identifying Selection and Moral Hazard Heterogeneity
As I depict along the horizontal axis of Figure 2, the sample consists of 15% always takers, 26%
compliers, and 59% never takers. Along the vertical axis, I show that during the study period from
March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009, always takers visited the ER 1.89 times, compliers visited
1.45 times if enrolled and 1.19 times if not, and never takers visited 0.85 times. The difference in
visits between enrolled and unenrolled compliers is equal to the LATE, as shown by Imbens and
Rubin (1997). I depict the LATE with an arrow to indicate its magnitude and direction. The
estimated LATE of 0.27 is consistent the headline finding of Taubman et al. (2014), who show that
moral hazard is positive—Medicaid increases ER utilization—for compliers.
Figure 2 provides more information than the LATE. As originally shown by Angrist (1990);
Angrist and Krueger (1992), the calculation of the LATE does not require the ability to calculate
averages of ER utilization conditional on Medicaid enrollment. Using the Wald (1940) approach, the
reduced form E[Y |Z = 1]−E[Y |Z = 0] is equal to 0.07, and the first stage E[D|Z = 1]−E[D|Z = 0]
is equal to 0.26. Dividing the reduced form divided by the first stage yields a LATE of 0.27 visits,
which is equal to the LATE reported in Figure 2.
The depiction in Figure 2 emphasizes that the LATE need not apply to always or never takers.
There could be reason to question whether the LATE applies to always and never takers if their
average outcomes are different from those of compliers. I compare average outcomes with the
untreated and treated outcome tests.
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Figure 2: Number of ER Visits for Always Takers, Compliers, and Never Takers

























Note. The number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study
period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. pC is the probability of enrollment in the control group, and pI
is the probability of enrollment in the intervention group.
5.1.1 The Untreated Outcome Test
The untreated outcome test provides evidence of adverse selection across compliers and never takers
in Oregon. When not enrolled in Medicaid, compliers visit the ER an average of 1.19 times, while
never takers visit 0.85 times. The average difference of 0.34 visits, reported as the result of the
untreated outcome test in Table 1, is statistically different from zero. The difference cannot reflect
treatment from Medicaid since both groups are not enrolled. Under the model, compliers enroll
in Medicaid before never takers, so the difference identifies adverse selection into Medicaid along
this range of the enrollment margin. Given adverse selection, I predict that enrollees in subsequent
expansions would use the ER less on average in the absence of Medicaid than current enrollees.
5.1.2 The Treated Outcome Test
When enrolled in Medicaid, always takers visit the ER an average of 1.89 times while compliers visit
an average of 1.45 times. The average difference of 0.44 visits, reported as the result of the treated
outcome test in Table 1, is statistically different from zero. Under the model, always takers enroll
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Enrolled 1.89 1.45 0.55 0.44
(0.08) (0.11) (0.45) (0.17)
Not Enrolled 1.35 1.19 0.85 0.34
(0.17) (0.11) (0.03) (0.13)
Treatment Effect 0.54 0.27 -0.29
(0.19) (0.15) (0.45)
Mean







Note. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. The shaded cells report extrapolated values from MTE-
reweighting via (18)–(20) for enrolled individuals (N=4,725) and individuals who are not enrolled (N=14,897). The
number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study period from
March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009.
in Medicaid before compliers, so their greater visits with Medicaid could reflect adverse selection,
decreasing moral hazard, or both. Without ancillary assumptions, I cannot separate selection
heterogeneity from moral hazard heterogeneity. However, based on the combined influence of
selection and moral hazard heterogeneity, I predict that ER utilization per Medicaid enrollee would
decrease if the Medicaid expansion implemented with the Oregon lottery were repealed.
5.2 Extrapolation Under Ancillary Assumptions
5.2.1 Oregon MTE(p)
Although I can make some policy predictions using the results of the treated and untreated outcome
tests, I impose ancillary assumptions to predict the moral hazard impact of a wider set of policies
that induce changes in enrollment. Figure 3 depicts the MTO, MUO, and MTE functions under
ancillary assumptions AA.1 and AA.2. On the vertical axis, the two points labeled with circular
markers indicate the average outcomes of always takers and enrolled compliers, which fall at the
median of the support for each group on the horizontal axis. These two points identify the intercept
and slope of the MTO function, depicted with a dotted line. The two points labeled with square
markers identify the intercept and slope of the MUO function, depicted with a dashed line. I depict
the MTE function, the vertical difference between the MTO and MUO functions, with a solid line.
As shown, the MTE function is positive for low levels of enrollment and negative for high levels of
enrollment, even though the LATE is positive.
For extrapolation to specific policies that dis-enroll all always takers or enroll all never takers,
I report values that I obtain via reweighting with (18)-(20) in the shaded cells of Table 1. I only
observe always takers when enrolled in Medicaid, and they visit the ER 1.89 times. Extrapolation
from observed ER utilization for unenrolled compliers and never takers indicates that if always
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Figure 3: MTO(p), MUO(p), and MTE(p)






























Intercept S.E. Slope S.E.
MTO(p) 2.05 (0.14) -2.12 (0.82)
MUO(p) 1.41 (0.19) -0.80 (0.31)
MTE(p) 0.64 (0.24) -1.32 (0.88)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. The number of ER visits represents the total number of
visits to the emergency department during the study period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. pC is the
probability of enrollment in the control group, and pI is the probability of enrollment in the intervention group.
takers were not enrolled in Medicaid, they would visit the ER 1.35 times, such that the treatment
effect of Medicaid for always takers is an increase of 0.54 visits. In contrast, extrapolation from
enrolled compliers and always takers shows that Medicaid decreases the average average ER uti-
lization of never takers by 2.9 visits. This finding suggests that if Medicaid were extended to all
never takers, their ER utilization would decrease. Accordingly, a hypothetical policy that builds on
the 2008 Oregon policy by enrolling all lottery entrants in Medicaid would decrease ER utilization
by 0.16 per person—the weighted average treatment effect for all untreated compliers and never
takers in the sample.10
5.2.2 Comparison to Massachusetts MTE(p)
Before extrapolating to Massachusetts, I assess whether the MTE within Oregon applies within
Massachusetts. I begin by recasting my previous work on the Massachusetts reform from Hackmann
et al. (2015), which builds on the Einav et al. (2010) model from the insurance literature, in
10The weighted average treatment effect for all untreated compliers and never takers in the sample is given by:
P(Z = 0)(pI − pC) ∗ E[YT − YU | pC < UD ≤ pI ] + (1− pI) ∗ E[YT − YU | pI < UD ≤ 1]
P(Z = 0)(pI − pC) + (1− pI)
.
Using this equation, I obtain (0.27*0.66*(0.41-0.15)+(-0.29)*(1.00-0.41))/(0.66*(0.41-0.15)+(1.00-0.41))= -0.16.
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terms of the MTE model with ancillary assumptions AA.1 and AA.2. To do so, in Figure 4, I
reproduce Figure 8 from Hackmann et al. (2015) using notation consistent with the MTE model
while presenting notation from the original figure in a lighter typeface. In Hackmann et al. (2015),
the Massachusetts reform shifts the demand curve upward by the individual mandate penalty π
and shifts the average cost curve downward by the change in markups. Equilibrium occurs at
the intersection of the demand curve and the average cost curve net of markups, which occurs at
I∗,pre = pC before the reform and I
∗,post = pI after the reform. Log premiums before and after the
reform, depicted by A and A′, identify the slope of the linear demand curve, given the penalty π.
Marginal costs before and after the reform, depicted by D and D′, identify the slope of the linear
marginal cost curve.
In Hackmann et al. (2015), as in Einav et al. (2010), the marginal cost curve is obtained from
the difference between the marginal insurer spending on the insured and marginal insurer spending
on the uninsured. Therefore, the marginal cost curve represents a Massachusetts MTE function in
terms of the log premium. This function, like the Oregon MTE function in terms of the number
of ER visits, is downward sloping, indicating that in both contexts, moral hazard decreases as the
fraction enrolled increases. I do not observe ER costs or visits in the Hackmann et al. (2015) data,
but evidence from the Oregon experiment shows that ER costs and total health care costs are
Figure 4: Figure 8 from Hackmann et al. (2015) Recast as Massachusetts MTE(p)
0 1
P ∗, post =8.4
AC∗, post =8.5
AC∗, pre =8.6







D (I, 0) D (I, π)
π = 0.24






UD: unobserved net cost of enrollment
I: fraction insured
log premium
Massachusetts MTE (p), MC(I)
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complements (Taubman et al., 2014).
5.2.3 MTE-Reweighting from Oregon MTE(p) to Massachusetts
Returning to the Oregon data because the Oregon experiment is the “gold standard,” I characterize
the Massachusetts reform as a subsequent expansion of Medicaid along the Oregon MTE. To do so,
I reproduce the Oregon MTE in Figure 5. I label the probability of health insurance coverage in
Massachusetts before the reform as pMAC = 0.89 and after the reform as p
MA
I = 0.94. I obtain these
values from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data that I used to study
the Massachusetts reform in Kolstad and Kowalski (2012). Unlike the Hackmann et al. (2015)
data, which only capture enrollment in the individual health insurance market, the BRFSS data
capture enrollment in the entire state. It is important to capture enrollment in the entire state for
comparison to the literature on the impact of the Massachusetts reform on ER utilization (Chen
et al., 2011; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012; Smulowitz et al., 2011).
Figure 5: Extrapolation of MTE(p) to Massachusetts
0 pORC = 0.15 p
OR























Note. The number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study
period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. pORC is the probability of enrollment in the control group in
Oregon, pORI the probability of enrollment in the intervention group in Oregon, p
MA
C the probability of enrollment in
the control group in the Massachusetts reform, and pMAI the probability of enrollment in the intervention group in
the Massachusetts reform.
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As shown, enrollment levels before and after the Massachusetts reform would entail enrollment
of a subset of never takers in Oregon. Therefore, application of the Oregon MTE to Massachusetts
implies that Massachusetts compliers are comparable to a subset of Oregon never takers in terms of
their unobserved net cost of enrollment UD. There is a case to be made that the Oregon sample is
actually a subset of the Massachusetts sample along the lower range of UD because all individuals
in the Oregon sample entered a lottery for Medicaid. Therefore, it is likely conservative to compare
Massachusetts compliers to this particular subset of Oregon never takers.
MTE-reweighting the Oregon MTE via (20) over the range from pMAC = 0.89 to p
MA
I = 0.94,
I predict that the Massachusetts reform should have decreased ER visits by an average of 0.57
visits among Massachusetts compliers. Miller (2012) finds that insurance enrollment induced by
the Massachusetts reform decreased ER visits by 0.67 to 1.28 visits per person per year, depending
on the empirical strategy. The decrease that I find over the 19 months from March 10, 2008 to
September 30, 2009 translates into a decrease of 0.36 visits per person per year (=(0.57/19)*12),
which is smaller than her estimates but of the same order of magnitude. Therefore, my extrapola-
tions can reconcile the increase in ER utilization in Oregon with the decrease in ER utilization in
Massachusetts using only variation in the unobserved net cost of enrollment UD.
5.3 Extrapolation Incorporating Observables
5.3.1 Self-Reported Health
To explore potential mechanisms for why the impact of coverage on ER utilization is positive for
some groups but negative for others, I examine observables. I begin by examining self-reported
health. I observe self-reported health for almost all individuals in the Massachusetts BRFSS data,
and I observe self-reported health for a subset of individuals in the Oregon administrative data who
were surveyed. Using the Oregon data, Finkelstein et al. (2012) shows that Medicaid improved self-
reported health, so I only compare the self-reported health of groups without Medicaid: compliers
who lost the lottery and never takers. As I describe in Appendix C, I obtain the average probability
that individuals in these groups reported fair or poor health.
As shown in Table 2, within Oregon and Massachusetts, I find that never takers are less likely
to be in fair or poor health than compliers who are not enrolled in Medicaid, consistent with
adverse selection via the untreated outcome test. However, differences in self-reported health
are more striking across both contexts than they are within each context. As I show in Table
2, 55% of Oregon compliers report fair or poor health, while only 34% of Oregon never takers
report fair or poor health. In stark contrast, only 21% of Massachusetts compliers report fair or
poor health. These comparisons suggest an important potential mechanism for my findings. Upon
gaining coverage, individuals in worse health (Oregon compliers) increase their ER utilization, while
individuals in better health (Oregon never takers and Massachusetts compliers) decrease their ER
utilization.
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Takers (1) - (2) (2) - (3)
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment of 2008
Fair or Poor Health, Not Enrolleda 0.42 0.55 0.34 0.20
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Number of Pre-period ER Visits 0.87 1.36 0.88 0.73 0.48 0.15
(0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)
Common Observables
Age 40.69 39.45 42.41 40.25 -2.96 2.16
(0.09) (0.29) (0.41) (0.19) (0.53) (0.57)
Female 0.56 0.72 0.53 0.53 0.19 0.003
(0.003) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
English 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.91 -0.02 0.01
(0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01)
N 19,643 2,986 5,092 11,565
Massachusetts Health Reform of 2006
Fair or Poor Health, Not Enrolleda 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Common Observables
Age 42.00 42.15 42.42 38.98 -0.26 3.43
(0.086) (0.12) (1.41) (0.49) (1.49) (1.57)
Female 0.51 0.52 0.43 0.38 0.10 0.04
(0.003) (0.004) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
English 0.96 0.98 0.86 0.81 0.12 0.05
(0.001) (0.001) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)




Note. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Data for the Massachusetts health reform are taken from
pooled annual samples of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from years 2004–2009 and re-
stricted to ages 21–64 (the age range of the Oregon sample). For the Massachusetts health reform, treatment is an
indicator that equals one for individuals with any form of health insurance (“Do you have any kind of health care
coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or government plans such as Medicare?”). The
instrument is an indicator that equals one in the post-period of the expansion on and after July 2007. “Age” is
measured in year 2008 for the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment and in year 2006 for the Massachusetts health re-
form. “Female” is a binary indicator for the gender of the respondent. “English” is a binary indicator that equals one
for individuals in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment who requested materials in English and that equals one
for individuals in the BRFSS who completed the interview in English. The number of pre-period visits is measured
before the study period from January 1, 2007 to March 9, 2008. “Fair or Poor Health” equals one when individuals
self-report having fair or poor health on a 5-point scale. aNumber of observations in the Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment with nonmissing self-reported health: 5,833. Number of observations in the BRFSS with nonmissing
self-reported health: 62,161.
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5.3.2 Previous ER Utilization
Examination of ER utilization from before the Oregon lottery took place corroborates the role
of health as a potential mechanism for why ER utilization increased in Oregon but decreased in
Massachusetts. For each individual in the Oregon administrative data, I observe the total number
of pre-period ER visits from January 1, 2007, to March 9, 2008. I report the average number
of per-period ER visits for always takers, compliers, and never takers in Table 2, calculated as
described in Appendix C. Always takers visited the ER an average of 1.36 times, while compliers
visited an average of 0.88 times, and never takers visited an average of 0.73 times. The monotonic
relationship in previous ER utilization across these groups indicates adverse selection on previous
ER utilization: individuals with larger previous ER utilization are more likely to enroll in Medicaid.
I also find heterogeneous moral hazard by previous ER utilization: individuals with larger pre-
vious ER utilization are more likely to increase their ER utilization upon Medicaid enrollment.
Indeed, I find that previous ER utilization can explain the entire decrease in moral hazard from
always takers to compliers to never takers. There is substantial variation in pre-period ER uti-
lization: 66% of individuals have zero visits, 17% have one visit, 11% have 2 to 3 visits, and 6%
have 4 or more visits in the pre-period. By incorporating controls for each of these visit ranges
into the MTE, I obtain a separate MTE(x, p) for each range. As depicted in Figure 6, the MTE(p)
function, which does not incorporate observables, has a pronounced downward slope, indicating
substantial unexplained heterogeneity in moral hazard. However, when I incorporate controls for
previous ER utilization into the MTE(x, p) function, I eliminate the negative slope, indicating that
the unexplained heterogeneity in moral hazard can be explained by previous ER utilization.
Looking beyond the slope of the MTE(x, p) function to its level at various values of pre-period
ER visits reveals a clear monotonic relationship between pre-period ER visits and the treatment
effect of Medicaid enrollment on subsequent ER visits. As depicted in Figure 6, the MTE(x, p) for
individuals with 4 or more pre-period visits is always positive, and the MTE(x, p) for individuals
with zero pre-period visits is always negative. Intuitively, individuals with high numbers of ER
visits in the pre-period increase their ER utilization upon gaining coverage, while individuals with
zero ER visits in the pre-period decrease their ER utilization upon gaining coverage.
Individuals induced to gain coverage through the Massachusetts reform had better health and
presumably lower ER utilization than individuals induced to gain coverage through the Oregon
experiment, which could explain why ER utilization decreased in Massachusetts but decreased in
Oregon. Unfortunately, I do not observe previous ER utilization in my Massachusetts data. Fur-
thermore, data from published studies that examine the impact of the Massachusetts health reform
on ER utilization are either not available at the individual level or they only include individuals
who visit a hospital or emergency room, making them unsuitable for comparison to data on pre-
period ER visits in Oregon (Chen et al., 2011; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012; Smulowitz
et al., 2011). Therefore, I cannot weight the Oregon MTE(x, p) to reflect previous ER utilization in
Massachusetts, however MTE-reweighting with with MTE(p) effectively allows me to extrapolate
based on an unobservable that captures previous ER utilization and health.
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Figure 6: MTE(x, p) with Previous ER Utilization
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MTE(x, p): pre-period ER visits
Note. The number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study
period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. Pre-period ER visits refers to a group of indicators for visiting
the ER 0 times, 1 time, 2–3 times, and 4 or more times during the pre-period from January 1, 2007 to March 9, 2008.
pC is the probability of enrollment in the control group, and pI is the probability of enrollment in the intervention
group. In this figure, the function for 1 pre-period ER visits has been shifted downward slightly to make it easier to
discern from the function for 2–3 pre-period ER visits.
5.3.3 LATE-Reweighting with Common Observables
To explore the potential for extrapolation with observables alone to reconcile the increase in ER
utilzation in Oregon with the decrease in Massachusetts, I begin by considering LATE-reweighting,
which relies only on observables. The three common observables available for all individuals in the
Massachusetts BRFSS data and the Oregon administrative data are age, gender, and an indicator
for communications in English. As I show in Table 2, the common observables are similar in
both samples. Such similarity is plausible even though Massachusetts is more urban than Oregon
because the Oregon administrative ER data are only drawn from the Portland area. Common
observables are also generally similar for Oregon and Massachusetts compliers, suggesting that
LATE-reweighting will not yield a Massachusetts LATE that differs dramatically from the Oregon
LATE.
To examine variation in the common observables available for LATE-reweighting, I use each
common observable to divide the sample into two subgroups, and I report LATEs within each
subgroup in Table 3. As shown, the LATEs within each subgroup are all positive, with the exception
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Table 3: Subgroup Analysis of Common Observables with LATE and MTE(p)





< mediana Female Male English
Non-
English
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment of 2008
0.27 0.14 0.44 0.14 0.39 0.30 -0.15
(0.15) (0.18) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.34)
0.15 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.16
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01)
pI 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.38
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
MTE intercept 0.64 0.98 0.31 0.48 0.92 0.72 0.14
(0.24) (0.28) (0.39) (0.32) (0.33) (0.25) (0.47)
MTE slope -1.32 -3.01 0.48 -1.06 -2.20 -1.51 -1.07
(0.88) (1.04) (1.49) (1.08) (1.40) (0.92) (2.07)
p* 0.48 0.33 -0.63 0.45 0.42 0.48 0.13
(2.84) (0.85) (10.37) (1.49) (3.47) (4.53) (11.99)
N 19,622 9,816 9,806 10,932 8,690 17,871 1,751
Massachusetts Health Reform of 2006
0.90 0.93 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.91 0.55
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.02)
0.95 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.74
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.02)





Note. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. The number of ER visits represents the total number of
visits to the emergency department during the study period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. The value
p∗ indicates the share of the sample with positive treatment effects when the MTE(p) curve slopes downward and the
share of the sample with negative treatment effects when the MTE(p) curve slopes upward. “Age” is measured in year
2008 for the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment and in year 2006 for the Massachusetts health reform.“English” is
an indicator variable for individuals in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment who requested materials in English
and that equals one for individuals in the BRFSS who completed the interview in English. “Non-English” is the
complement of “English.” aThe median age in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment is 41. I use the same age to
construct the Massachusetts subgroups.
of the LATE within the group that requested communication in a language other than English.
Taubman et al. (2014) report LATEs within a wide variety of observable subgroups and also find
that almost all are positive. Because LATEs within each subgroup are almost all positive, LATE-
reweighting based on any of the common observables yields a positive treatment effect for almost
any weights. Therefore, LATE-reweighting based only on the common observables cannot reconcile
the positive treatment effect in Oregon with the negative treatment effect in Oregon.
It is not surprising that LATE-reweighting with common observables cannot explain treatment
effect heterogeneity across Oregon and Massachusetts because observables cannot explain treatment
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Figure 7: MTE(x, p) with Previous ER Utilization vs. MTE(x, p) with Common Observables



























E[MTE(X, p)]: age, female, English
E[MTE(X, p)]: pre-period ER visits
Note. The number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study
period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. Pre-period ER visits refers to a group of indicators for visiting
the ER 0 times, 1 time, 2–3 times, and 4 or more times during the pre-period from January 1, 2007 to March 9, 2008.
“Age” is measured in year 2008. “Female” is a binary indicator for the gender of the respondent. “English” is a
binary indicator that equals one for individuals who requested materials in English. The specification with common
covariates (age, female, English) includes all two-way interactions. pC is the probability of enrollment in the control
group, and pI is the probability of enrollment in the intervention group.
effect heterogeneity within Oregon. To demonstrate, I estimate an MTE within each subgroup, and
I report the slope and intercept in Table 3. In almost all subgroups, the MTE slopes downward.
When the MTE slopes downward, the horizontal intercept p∗ gives the fraction of individuals
predicted to have positive treatment effects. In all but one subgroup, even though the LATEs
are positive, the MTEs predict that the majority of individuals have negative treatment effects,
indicating that the common observables leave substantial heterogeneity unexplained.
5.3.4 MTE-Reweighting with Common Observables
When I include all of the common observables as well as their two-way interactions in the MTE,
substantial heterogeneity remains unexplained. I emphasize the comparison of unexplained hetere-
ogeneity across various MTE functions in Figure 7. To do so, I present E[MTE(x, p)] functions,
which average included observed heterogeneity across all individuals. Consistent with the depiction
in Figure 6, the inclusion of pre-period ER visits in MTE(x, p) results in a function that is flatter
26
than MTE(p). Therefore, the inclusion of pre-period ER visits decreases unexplained heterogeneity
in the treatment effect. In contrast, the inclusion of the common observables in MTE(x, p) results
in a function that is steeper than MTE(p). Therefore, the inclusion of pre-period ER visits increases
unexplained heterogeneity in the treatment effect.
MTE-reweighting with observables can still proceed if there is unexplained heterogeneity in
the treatment effect. To reweight the Oregon MTE with common observables for extrapolation
to Massachusetts, I estimate the average MTE(x, p) for compliers in Massachusetts to construct
E[MTE(XMA, p)]. In Figure 8, I plot E[MTE(XMA, p)]. Reweighting the Oregon MTE to predict
the impact of the Massachusetts reform on ER utilization, I apply (20) using the pre-reform level
of coverage in Massachusetts pMAC and the post-reform level of coverage in Massachusetts p
MA
I . I
predict that the Massachusetts reform will decrease emergency room utilization by 0.79 visits over
Figure 8: Extrapolation of MTE(x, p) to Massachusetts
0 pORC = 0.15 p
OR



























E[MTE(XMA, p)]: age, female, English
Note. The number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study
period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. “Age” is measured in year 2008 for the Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment and in year 2006 for the Massachusetts health reform.“English” is an indicator variable for individuals in
the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment who requested materials in English and that equals one for individuals in
the BRFSS who completed the interview in English. The specification with common covariates (age, female, English)
includes all two-way interactions. pORC is the probability of enrollment in the control group in Oregon, p
OR
I the
probability of enrollment in the intervention group in Oregon, pMAC the probability of enrollment in the control group
in the Massachusetts reform, and pMAI the probability of enrollment in the intervention group in the Massachusetts
reform.
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an approximately 19 month period. Translating this decrease into an annual decrease, I predict
a decrease of 0.50 visits per person per year (=(0.79/19)*12), which is even closer to the Miller
(2012) estimates of 0.67 to 1.28 than the decrease that I predict with the Oregon MTE(p), also
plotted for comparison.
Figure 8 illustrates that accounting for differences in UD between Oregon and Massachusetts has
a much larger impact than accounting for differences in common observables between Oregon and
Massachusetts. If I account for the observables of Massachusetts compliers with E[MTE(XMA, p)],
but do not account for range of UD for Massachusetts compliers, then I predict a Massachusetts
LATE of 0.41, which is even more positive than the LATE of 0.27 estimated in Oregon. Such an
approach, which can be considered a form of LATE-reweighting, does not reconcile the positive
LATE in Oregon with the negative LATE in Massachusetts, given that common observables do not
explain treatment effect heterogeneneity across UD in Oregon. This finding demonstrates that the
power of LATE-weighting to reconcile results across contexts is limited by the common observables
available for reweighting.
It should come as no surprise that the common observables that happen to be available in two
contexts might not explain treatment effect heterogeneity across the two contexts. The MTE offers
guidance on which observables can potentially explain treatment effect heterogeneity. Within Ore-
gon and across Oregon and Massachusetts, it appears that variables that capture heterogeneity in
self-reported health can potentially explain treatment effect heterogeneity. Previous ER utilization
can potentially explain treatment effect heterogeneity, but common observables cannot. Regard-
less, MTE-reweighting with the common observables can still reconcile the positive treatment effect
induced by the Oregon experiment with the negative treatment effect induced by the Massachusetts
reform.
6 Conclusion
I aim to shed light on why emergency room (ER) utilization increased following the Oregon Health
Insurance Experiment but decreased following the Massachusetts reform. To do so, I combine
insights from the literatures on insurance and treatment effects. Starting from the Oregon Health
Insurance Experiment as the “gold standard,” I find heterogeneous moral hazard: although Oregon
compliers increase their ER utilization upon gaining coverage, Oregon never takers would decrease
their ER utilization upon gaining coverage. I also find heterogeneous selection: Oregon never takers
report better health than Oregon compliers.
Next, I extrapolate my findings from within the Oregon experiment to Massachusetts. Given
higher levels of coverage in Massachusetts, Massachusetts compliers are comparable to a subset of
Oregon never takers. Like Oregon never takers, Massachusetts compliers report better health than
Oregon compliers. Therefore, I can reconcile the increase in ER utilization induced by the Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment with the decrease in ER utilization induced by the Massachusetts
while. Upon gaining coverage, individuals who report worse health increase their ER utilization,
while individuals who report better health decrease their ER utilization.
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Appendix A Proof of the Enrollment Equation (D = 1{UD ≤ P(D = 1 | Z = z,X)})
Medicaid enrollment D is given by
D = 1{0 ≤ VT − VU}
= 1{0 ≤ µT (z,X) + νT − µU (z,X)− νU}
= 1{νU − νT ≤ µT (z,X)− µU (z,X)}
= 1{F (νU − νT ) ≤ F (µT (z,X)− µU (z,X))} (F increasing under A.2)
= 1{UD ≤ F (µT (z,X)− µU (z,X))} (UD = F (νU − νT | X) by definition)
= 1{UD ≤ P(D = 1 | Z = z,X)},
where the last equality follows from
F (µT (z,X)− µU (z,X) | X) = P(νU − νT ≤ µT (z,X)− µU (z,X) | X)
= P(νU − νT ≤ µT (Z,X)− µU (Z,X) | Z = z,X)
((νU − νT ) ⊥ Z | X by A.1)
= P(0 ≤ µT (Z,X) + νT − µU (Z,X)− νU | Z = z,X)
= P(0 ≤ VT − VU | Z = z,X)
= P(D = 1 | Z = z,X). 
Appendix B Proof that UD = F (νU − νT ) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1
The result that UD is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 is not a separate assumption of the
model. It is due to the “probability integral transformation,” which shows that the cumulative
distribution function of any random variable ν̃ = νT − νU applied to itself must be distributed
uniformly between 0 and 1 (for example, see Casella and Berger (2002, page 54)):
A random variable Y is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 if and only if FY (x) = x for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Therefore, UD is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1:
FUD(u) = P (UD ≤ u)
= P (F (νU − νT ) ≤ u)
= P (νU − νT ≤ F−1(u)) (F increasing under A.2)
= F (F−1(u)) = u. (F continuous under A.2)

Appendix C Averages for Always Takers, Compliers, and Never Takers
Imbens and Rubin (1997), Katz et al. (2001), Abadie (2002), and Abadie (2003) rely on the LATE
assumptions to calculate average outcomes and observables of always takers, compliers, and never
takers. For consistency with my exposition, I perform the same calculations using the MTE model
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that assumes no more than the LATE assumptions. I build intuition with a graphical illustration
that follows from the model.
I identify the expected value of YT for always takers as follows, supressing X for simplicity:
E[Y | D = 1, Z = 0] = E[YU +D(YT − YU ) | D = 1, Z = 0] (by (7))
= E[YT | D = 1, Z = 0]
= E[YT | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pC , Z = 0] (by (6), where pC = P (D = 1|Z = 0))
= E[gT (UD, γT ) | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pC , Z = 0] (by (8))
= E[gT (UD, γT ) | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pC ] (Z ⊥ (UD, γT ) by (A.5))
= E[YT | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pC ].
I use similar steps to calculate the expected value of YT for lottery winners enrolled in Medicaid
E[YT | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pI ] = E[Y | D = 1, Z = 1], the expected value of YU for never takers E[YU | pI <
Figure C1: Graphical Illustration of Average Number of ER Visits for Compliers


























Note. The number of ER visits represents the total number of visits to the emergency department during the study
period from March 10, 2008 to September 30, 2009. pC is the probability of enrollment in the control group, and pI
is the probability of enrollment in the intervention group.
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UD ≤ 1] = E[Y | D = 0, Z = 1], and the expected value of YU for lottery losers not enrolled in
Medicaid E[YU | pC < UD ≤ pI ] = E[Y | D = 0, Z = 0]. I then use the four resulting values to
calculate the expected value of YT for compliers enrolled in Medicaid:
E[YT | pC < UD ≤ pI ] =
pI
pI − pC
E[YT | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pI ]−
pC
pI − pC
E[YT | 0 ≤ UD ≤ pC ],
and the expected value of YU for compliers not enrolled in Medicaid:
E[YU | pC < UD ≤ pI ] =
1− pC
pI − pC
E[YU | pC < UD ≤ 1]−
1− pI
pI − pC
E[YU | pI < UD ≤ 1].
I illustrate the calculations graphically using values from Oregon data in Figure C1. I use
bolded dotted lines to depict average ER utilization when enrolled in Medicaid, YT , for two observed
groups: lottery losers enrolled in Medicaid (0 ≤ UD ≤ pC) and lottery winners enrolled in Medicaid
(0 ≤ UD ≤ pI). I use bolded dashed lines to depict average ER utilization when not enrolled in
Medicaid, YU , for two observed groups: lottery losers not enrolled in Medicaid (pC < UD ≤ 1)
and lottery winners not enrolled in Medicaid (pI < UD ≤ 1). I depict the calculated outcomes for
compliers with lighter shading.
To calculate the average observable X for each group, I begin with the same approach. Even
though average outcomes of compliers should depend on whether they win or lose the lottery, av-
erage observables of compliers should not. Therefore, I weight the average observables of compliers
who win and lose the lottery by their respective probabilities:
E[X | pC < UD ≤ pI ] = P(Z = 1)E[X | pC < UD ≤ pI ] + P(Z = 0)E[X | pC < UD ≤ pI ].
Appendix D Estimating MTO(x, p), MUO(x, p), and MTE(x, p) of order k ≥ 1 in p.
While this paper considers the case where MTO(x, p) and MUO(x, p) are polynomials of order
k = 1, the steps below present the general estimation strategy for polynomials of order k ≥ 1:
1. Estimate propensity scores, p̂, for all individuals in the sample by fitting






and using α̂0, α̂1, α̂2, and α̂3 to predict D conditional on Z and observables X.
2. For each j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, apply h(j)T (·) derived in Appendix E and h
(j)
U (·) derived in Appendix
F to the propensity scores, p̂, estimated in step 1. These transformations will allow us to use












(1 + j)(1− p̂) .
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3. Condition the sample on treated individuals (D = 1), and use OLS to estimate:





T (p̂) + γT .




4. Condition the sample on untreated individuals (D = 0), and use OLS to estimate:





U (p̂) + γU .




5. Construct MTE(x, p) = MTO(x, p)−MUO(x, p) = (β̂T − β̂U )′x+
∑k
j=0(λ̂Tj − λ̂Uj)pj .
Appendix E Derivation of MTO(x, p).
The objective of this appendix is to derive a transformation that can be applied to propensity
scores to estimate the MTO function of the following form:





We derive the MTO function from the average treated outcome function, which can be estimated
directly. Taking the expectation of Y conditional on observables x and conditional on enrollment
in Medicaid given propensity score p gives the average treated outcome function:






































1+j gives the MTO parameters, λTj , from (21).
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Appendix F Derivation of MUO(x, p).
The objective of this appendix is to derive a transformation that can be applied to propensity
scores to estimate the MUO function of the following form:





We derive the MUO function from the average untreated outcome function, which can be estimated
directly. Taking the expectation of Y conditional on observables x and conditional on enrollment
in Medicaid given propensity score p gives the average untreated outcome function:

































(1 + j)(1− p) . (24)




(1+j)(1−p) gives the MUO parameters, λUj ,
from (23).
References
Oregon health insurance experiment public use data. URL http://www.nber.org/oregon/data.
html.
Alberto Abadie. Bootstrap tests for distributional treatment effects in instrumental variable models.
Journal of the American statistical Association, 97(457):284–292, 2002.
Alberto Abadie. Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models.
Journal of econometrics, 113(2):231–263, 2003.
Michael Anderson, Carlos Dobkin, and Tal Gross. The effect of health insurance coverage on the
use of medical services. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(1):1–27, 2012.
Michael L Anderson, Carlos Dobkin, and Tal Gross. The effect of health insurance on emergency
33
department visits: Evidence from an age-based eligibility threshold. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 96(1):189–195, 2014.
JD Angrist. Estimating the labor market impact of voluntary military service using social security
data on military applicants. Econometrica, 66(2):249–288, 1998.
Joshua D Angrist. Lifetime earnings and the vietnam era draft lottery: evidence from social security
administrative records. The American Economic Review, pages 313–336, 1990.
Joshua D Angrist. Treatment effect heterogeneity in theory and practice*. The Economic Journal,
114(494):C52–C83, 2004.
Joshua D Angrist and Ivan Fernandez-Val. Extrapolate-ing: External validity and. In Advances
in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 3, Econometrics: Tenth World Congress, volume 51,
page 401. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Joshua D Angrist and Alan B Krueger. The effect of age at school entry on educational attainment:
an application of instrumental variables with moments from two samples. Journal of the American
statistical Association, 87(418):328–336, 1992.
Joshua D Angrist, Guido W Imbens, and Donald B Rubin. Identification of causal effects using
instrumental variables. Journal of the American statistical Association, 91(434):444–455, 1996.
Katherine Baicker, Sarah Taubman, Heidi L. Allen, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph P.
Newhouse, Eric C. Schneider, Bill J. Wright, Alan M. Zaslavsky, and Amy N. Finkelstein. The
oregon experiment - effects of medicaid on clinical outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine,
368(18):1713–1722, 2013.
Katherine Baicker, Amy Finkelstein, Jae Song, and Sarah Taubman. The impact of medicaid on
labor market activity and program participation: Evidence from the oregon health insurance
experiment. American Economic Review, 104(5):322–28, 2014.
Marinho Bertanha and Guido W. Imbens. External validity in fuzzy regression discontinuity designs.
Working Paper 20773, National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2014.
Anders Björklund and Robert Moffitt. The estimation of wage gains and welfare gains in self-
selection models. The Review of Economics and Statistics, pages 42–49, 1987.
Dan A Black, Joonhwi Joo, Robert LaLonde, Jeffrey A Smith, and Evan J Taylor. Simple tests for
selection bias: Learning more from instrumental variables. 2015.
Christian N Brinch, Magne Mogstad, and Matthew Wiswall. Beyond late with a discrete instrument.
Journal of Political Economy, 125(4):985–1039, 2017.
Pedro Carneiro and Sokbae Lee. Estimating distributions of potential outcomes using local in-
strumental variables with an application to changes in college enrollment and wage inequality.
Journal of Econometrics, 149(2):191–208, 2009.
34
Pedro Carneiro, James J. Heckman, and Edward J. Vytlacil. Estimating marginal returns to
education. American Economic Review, 101(6):2754–81, October 2011.
George Casella and Roger L Berger. Statistical inference, volume 2. Duxbury Pacific Grove, CA,
2002.
Christopher Chen, Gabriel Scheffler, and Amitabh Chandra. Massachusetts’ health care reform
and emergency department utilization. New England Journal of Medicine, 365(12):e25, 2011.
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